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Abstract 
Historically, the United States has strongly promoted intellectual property (IP) rights, 
playing a heavy role to ensure that IP was included in international trade negotiations.  
This paper describes the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on U.S. trade policies 
with respect to intellectual property, and the ensuing consequences on access to 
medicines, both domestically and abroad, during public health emergencies.  More 
specifically, the paper focuses on compulsory licensing as a means of government 
intervention to ensure adequate access to patented drugs.  Despite the U.S. government’s 
legal ability to implement a compulsory licensing scheme, compulsory licensing for 
pharmaceutical patents may be altogether unnecessary due to a combination of factors, 
including the unique relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. 
government, the U.S. tradition of using IP protections for innovation incentives, and the 
overall domestic manufacturing and production capacity for drugs.   
 
   2 
Introduction 
Between bioterrorism and the ever-looming threat of national pandemic, the United 
States has faced a growing need for an effective and efficient drug dissemination scheme during 
public health emergencies.  However, the U.S. has firmly positioned itself in the international 
community as a strong proponent of rigid intellectual property (IP) protections, with much of the 
push stemming from the pharmaceutical industry, which bases much of its business and 
investment strategies on patent protections for novel drugs.  This has resulted in criticisms 
concerning not only the implications of these strong protections on developing countries in need 
of access to affordable medicines, but also the implications within the U.S. during domestic 
public health crises.  That is, the strong IP position of the U.S. internationally may handcuff its 
ability to access patented drugs in an efficient manner during domestic public health 
emergencies. 
Compulsory licensing, where the government grants a license for someone other than the 
patent holder to use a patent without the patent holder’s authorization,
1 is one method employed 
by countries to access drugs for public health purposes.  Some reasons for utilizing compulsory 
licenses include prohibitive costs of drugs, anti-competitive practices by pharmaceutical 
companies, insufficient market supply, public health emergencies, and the need for a 
pharmaceutical industrial base.
2  Most of these reasons, though, are more relevant to developing 
countries than to developed countries such that compulsory licensing has proven a relatively 
contentious issue.  Where developing countries view compulsory licensing as “necessary to 
                                                        
1 CARLOS M. CORREA & ABDULQAWI YUSUF, IP AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 436–437 (2d 
ed. 2008).  
2 Id. at 437.   3 
ensure access to socially beneficial technologies,” countries like the U.S. see compulsory 
licensing as harmful to both innovation “and creation of the very technology at issue.”
3 
Before the 1970s, the U.S. was one of the few countries that issued patents on 
pharmaceutical products.
4  By the 1970s and ‘80s, other developed countries began to 
incorporate pharmaceuticals among their patented subject matter, but the majority of developing 
countries continued to resist.
5  Currently in the U.S., product patents are granted for a twenty-
year period from the date on which the patent application was filed,
6 and include the exclusive 
right to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import the patented drug.
7  The benefits of the twenty-
year exclusivity period, however, are not fully realized by inventors of pharmaceutical products 
because of the time added by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval process.
8  To 
compensate, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-
Waxman Act)
9 was implemented in part to extend the term of patents that fell subject to the FDA 
approval process during which the patentee is unable to sell or market the product.
10   
The decision to invest in developing a new drug depends upon whether the expected 
return is sufficient to cover research and development (R&D) and marketing costs.
11  While 
some have argued that the Hatch-Waxman Act, as it impacts the pharmaceutical industry today, 
                                                        
3 Christopher A. Cotropia, Compulsory licensing under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the United States’ Decision 
in eBay v. MercExchange, in PATENT LAW & THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Toshiko 
Takenaka ed., 2009). 
4 Sumner La Croix & Ming Liu, Patents and Access to Essential Medicines, in FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS AND 
GLOBALIZATION VOLUME 2: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND TRADE 437 (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008).  For 
a more detailed explanation of the development of pharmaceutical patent protections globally, see id. at 437–438.   
5 Id. at 437–438. 
6 35 USC. § 154(a)(2) (2008). 
7 § 154(d)(1)(a)(i). 
8 See La Croix & Liu, supra note 4, at 433.   
9 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.  Hatch-Waxman as a whole represented a compromise between the brand name 
and generic drug industries, by providing for the expedited approval of generic drugs, while also increasing the 
effective market exclusivity period of pharmaceutical patents.  See id. 
10 35 USC. § 156.  The maximum extension granted can be five years, with the total period of market exclusivity not 
being able to exceed fourteen years.  Id.   
11 La Croix & Liu, supra, note 4, at 427.    4 
has proven inadequate to compensate for the investment necessary to develop new drugs,
12 
thereby discouraging pharmaceutical innovation, the pharmaceutical industry has nevertheless 
been successful in promoting its cause within the international community.  According to the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), “only one of every 10,000 
potential medicines investigated by America’s research-based pharmaceutical companies makes 
it through the research and development pipeline and is approved for patient use by the [FDA].  
Winning approval, on average, takes 15 years of research and development and costs over $800 
million dollars.”
13  From this standpoint, issuing compulsory licenses during times of public 
health emergencies could devastate the pharmaceutical industry because of the risk of being 
unable to recoup R&D dollars.   
This paper provides a historical overview of compulsory licensing from the U.S. 
perspective specifically as it relates to public health and pharmaceuticals.  Pervading throughout 
this overview is the persistence of U.S. policies in maintaining rigorous IP protections despite 
emerging needs for increased, and sometimes immediate, access to pharmaceutical products both 
domestically and abroad.  Part I begins with an account of the essential role that the U.S. played 
in ensuring that IP was made a part of international trade negotiations.  U.S. efforts in these 
negotiations resulted in the adoption of what is now the primary international IP agreement, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IP Rights (TRIPS).  The section concludes with a brief 
overview of TRIPS, focusing on the articles relevant to compulsory licensing.  Section II 
continues on to describe the post-TRIPS compulsory licensing situation with respect to 
HIV/AIDS in developing countries, the subsequent Doha Declaration clarifying certain TRIPS 
provisions, and the ensuing U.S. response.  The latter part of Section II then proceeds to discuss 
                                                        
12 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 
54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 194 (1999).  
13 PhRMA, Innovation, http://www.phrma.org/innovation (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).   5 
the current state of U.S. trade policy with respect to compulsory licensing, describing the 
country’s continued efforts to promote IP rights.   
Section III transitions into a detailed description of one of the main mechanisms that the 
U.S. government can employ to issue compulsory licenses domestically, 28 U.S.C. § 1498, 
which provides the government with broad discretion to intentionally infringe on patent rights.  
This statute has been implicated during both of the most recent public health crises faced by the 
U.S., the 2001 anthrax attacks and the 2005 avian flu pandemic scare, forcing the U.S. to make 
strategic decisions on accessing patented drugs domestically without undermining its strong 
defense of IP rights abroad.   In addition, Section III provides a brief summary of two other 
compulsory licensing schemes that are relevant to public health emergencies—the Bayh-Dole 
Act “march-in” provision, and injunction denials by courts in patent infringement actions in light 
of eBay v. MercExchange.  Finally, Part IV concludes by tying the pieces together to suggest that 
despite past attempts, a standard compulsory licensing scheme for pharmaceutical products 
during public health emergencies is unlikely to be achieved within the U.S, and may ultimately 
be unnecessary. 
I.  US Involvement in Intellectual Property and International Trade Agreements  
a.  TRIPS  
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IP Rights (TRIPS)
14 currently stands as the 
cornerstone of international IP law as it exists today. Administered by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), TRIPS sets the minimum standards for many IP regulations for all WTO 
member countries.  TRIPS was among a number of agreements to which WTO membership was 
                                                        
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].   6 
conditioned, and was negotiated during the Uruguay Round of trade talks that ultimately resulted 
in the creation of the WTO in 1994, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) as the international organization responsible for trade.
15  Notably, IP regulations and 
standards were not always under the auspices of the WTO.   In fact, placing the primary 
international IP regime under the WTO’s domain stemmed from an idea that was promoted by 
the U.S. since the 1980s.
16  As summarized by one author, during the IP negotiations at the 
Uruguay Rounds, the U.S. “was able to persuade more than 100 other countries that they, as net 
importers of technological and cultural information, should pay more for the importation of that 
information.”
17   
Prior to TRIPS adoption, there already existed the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), founded in 1967, with a mandate “to promote the protection of intellectual 
property throughout the world through cooperation among states and in collaboration with other 
international organizations.”
18  WIPO became a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) 
in 1974
19 and currently has 184 member states,
20 as compared the WTO’s 153 members.
21  It was 
                                                        
15 GATT regulated world trade from 1948 to 1994, but was a provisional agreement throughout that time.  While 
considered successful in liberalizing trade, GATT became increasingly unable to keep up with the growing 
complexity of the world market and after considerable effort the Uruguay Round of discussions began in 1986.  The 
final deal creating the WTO was signed on April 15, 1994.  See id.  For more information on the history of the WTO 
and GATT, see World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO—The GATT Years: From Havana to 
Marrakesh, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010); World 
Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO—Uruguay Round, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). 
 
  
16 See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 39–87 (2000). 
17 Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights in Information: The story of TRIPS at the GATT, 13 Prometheus 6, 7 
(1995). 
18 World Intellectual Property Organization, What is WIPO?, http://www.wipo.int/about-
wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). 
19 World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Treaties—General Information, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). 
20 World Intellectual Property Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2010). 
21 World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).   7 
tasked with administering the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 
and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886—the former 
an attempt to provide national treatment of patents and trademarks, while the latter an attempt to 
do so for copyrights.  Given WIPO’s mandate, it at first glance would have seemed to be the 
more appropriate avenue by which to establish minimum standards for the regulation of IP rights 
on an international scale.  However, the nature of the WIPO regime was such that “[s]tates 
retained enormous sovereign discretion over IP standard-setting,” where the principle of 
“national treatment” was all that governed.
22  With developing countries disinclined to abide by 
the Paris and Berne Conventions, in part because of their concern that granting strong IP rights 
would make technologies prohibitively expensive, WIPO’s lack of strong enforcement 
mechanisms because problematic. 
WIPO’s relative impotence in its ability to harmonize international IP was indicative of 
the different needs of developing versus developed countries.  Developing countries were 
interested in global IP provisions that would give them increased access to patent protected 
technologies—these countries were generally consumers and importers of IP.
23  For example, 
some countries had compulsory licensing laws that allowed local firms to manufacture generic 
versions of patented drugs shortly after, or in the case of Argentina even before, those drugs hit 
the markets of developed countries.
24  They viewed this as a “rational social policy for the 
educational and health-care needs of its citizens.”
25  On the other hand, developed countries were 
keen on taking measures to protect their own IP interests and saw decreased patent protections as 
                                                        
22 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 17, at 60.  See also ROBERT E. GROSSE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND 
GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE 21
ST CENTURY 347 (2005) (“regulatory heterogeneity was legitimized by these 
treaties, making regulatory homogeneity in IP laws that much more difficult to attain.”) 
23 SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 9 
(2003).  
24 GROSSE, supra note 22, at 347, 349-350. 
25 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 16, at 61.   8 
free-riding.
26  The U.S. was especially frustrated with the lax standards of the international 
community because their industries were heavily dependent upon IP protections as industry 
backbones.
27  
It was under these circumstances that an idea was developed to link IP with trade in order 
to first, globalize IP standards and make them consistent, and second, extend the enforcement 
mechanisms available in the trade context to IP.
28  Linking these two fields would give the U.S. 
strategic leverage over developing countries, which while having little desire to enforce stringent 
IP standards nevertheless had strong interests in international trade.
29  Conversely, developing 
countries were more inclined to prefer WIPO as the setting for global IP discussion because it 
offered a one-state-one-vote rule that increased their voting influence.
30  In addition, the Paris 
and Berne Conventions lacked enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance, providing 
developing countries with more reason to seek WIPO as the IP regulatory organization as 
opposed to the WTO.
31   
Growing discontent with WIPO’s inability to establish stronger IP protections resulted in 
coordination by industry to urge the U.S. to change its trade policy in international negotiations.  
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry had a particular interest in more rigorous protections because 
of the heavy investment required to successfully develop commercially profitable drugs 
combined with the ease of subsequent reverse engineering by generic manufacturers— average 
research and development costs in the 1980s were 18% as compared to 4–6% in other 
                                                        
26 Id.   
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Drahos, supra note 17, at 7.  Michael Ryan called this negotiation tactic, “linkage-bargain diplomacy” where “[a] 
negotiator offers to the opposing negotiator something important in order to receive in return a concession that 
otherwise would not have been offered.” MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND 
THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 92 (Brookings Institution Press ed. 1998). 
30 BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra note 16, at 566; DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 10 (2002).  
31 MATTHEWS, supra note 20, at 11.  See also BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra note 16, at 61.   9 
technology industries.
32  Pfizer, a large U.S. pharmaceutical company that had made a long-term 
commitment to expand business to developing countries,
33 emerged as the leader of the 
pharmaceutical industry lobbying movement because of the commitment of its CEO, Edmund 
Pratt.  Pratt had strong views on the need for IP reform and worked to notify other companies of 
the wisdom in basing the reform in trade, despite potential free-rider problems of fighting on 
their behalves.
34  Perhaps his main mode of influence was through his position as chairman of 
the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations (ACTN) from 1981 to 1987.  The ACTN served 
to provide advice from the business industry to the U.S. Trade Representatives (USTR), which in 
turn represented the U.S. in international trade negotiations.  Through Pratt’s leadership, the 
ACTN succeeded in recommending that the U.S. “have a long-term goal of placing IP in the 
GATT.”
35  The idea, ultimately promoted by the Task Force on IP established by ACTN, was to 
take advantage of developing countries’ dependency on the U.S. market by conditioning 
privileges, like duty-free trading, on IP concessions (i.e. increasing protections).
36   
As the private sector took on an increasingly active role in its attempts to formulate U.S. 
trade policy in the 1980s, the government finally adopted an official position linking IP and trade 
                                                        
32 GROSSE, supra note 22, at 349.  Grosse speculates that the reason pharmaceutical industries in other high-income 
countries did not initiate efforts to reform IP laws was because  
only US pharmaceutical firms had a home government powerful enough to lead the fight to change global 
IP rules.  None of the European nations . . . had sufficient leverage over trading partners to force them to 
reform IP laws, and getting the European Community to act in unison on any issue, including IP, would 
have been difficult.  It might also be argued that by the 1980s the US government was much more receptive 
to policy advice from the private sector than was the European Commission to similar advice from firms in 
member countries.  Id. at 350.  
33 Drahos, supra note 17, at 8; GROSSE, supra note 22, at 350 (“In 1990, developing countries accounted for only 
10–12 percent of Pfizer’s total sales, but [Pfizer’s CEO] Pratt believed these markets had high growth potential and 
would be increasingly important to the firm.”); BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra note 16, at 62.  
34 GROSSE, supra note 22, at 350; Drahos, supra note 17, at 8; SELL, supra note 23, at 83 (“Pratt of Pfizer was active 
in Washington rallying others to the cause of incorporating intellectual property into the trade agenda.  He called 
upon the membership of the PMA [Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America, now the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America] and CMA [Chemical Manufacturers Association] to lobby vigorously for stronger 
IP protection.”). 
35 BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra note 16, at 62; Drahos, supra note 17, at 9. 
36 BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra note 16, at 62.     10 
in 1984.
37  Then, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, the assistant secretary of commerce and commission of 
patents and trademarks, “delivered a strong statement outlining the relationship between patents, 
trademarks, and international trade.”
38  By this point, private industry had convincingly framed 
its IP objectives as imperative to U.S. trade policy, or as one author described, “the IP activists 
captured the imagination of policymakers and persuaded them to adopt their private interests as 
U.S. national interests.”
39  To exemplify the private industry’s success, in a statement Congress 
on TRIPS, Carla A. Hills, a U.S. Trade Representative, commented that the U.S. estimated losses 
caused by inadequate IP protections were between $43 and $61 billion in 1986.
40  Furthermore, 
not only were U.S. businesses losing money, “but more importantly, our economy is losing the 
competitive edge we gain from research and development, innovation and creativity.”
41   
Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. adopted both bilateral and multilateral approaches to 
strengthen intellectual protections.  On the bilateral front, the U.S. enacted the Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984,
42 amending Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
43 to impose trade sanctions on 
foreign governments that did not adequately provide for IP protections.
44  On the multilateral 
front, the ACTN was initially unsuccessful in convincing the rest of the international community 
                                                        
37 SELL, supra note 23, at 81–82.  
38 Id. at 83. 
39 Id. at 8.  Drahos also gives an account of the Mark Twain-like “beautifully simple” story that IP lobbyists were 
able to tell on Capital Hill: “Stronger property rights were needed to protect American ideas and industry.  Better 
protection meant more jobs and these intellectual property based industries were the very ones that would restore the 
US to a positive trade balance with the world.”  Drahos, supra note 17, at 8.   
40 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989) (testimony of 
Carla A. Hills), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1079/is_n2152_v89/ai_8355287/?tag=content;col1. 
41Id.  In particular, the US became concerned with remaining competitive in the global economy in light of the 
growing success of Asia in the 1980s.  Drahos, supra note 17, at 7–8. 
42 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3000 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C § 2101 et. 
seq.). 
43 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2101 et. seq.). 
44 SELL, supra note 23, at 85–86.  “These amendments also included IP protection as a new criterion for assessing 
developing countries’ eligibility for non-reciprocal trade concessions under the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) program.”  Id. at 86.  For more information on the bilateral approach, see id. at 81–95; Drahos, supra note 17, 
at 9–12; RYAN, supra note 29, at 67–89.   11 
for the need to incorporate IP in GATT discussions.  Consequently, proceeding from the work of 
ACTN, the IP Coalition (IPC)
 45 was formed as an effort to combine the weight of industry 
across all technology fields in order gain support from Europe, Canada, Japan, and other 
members of the Quad—“the most powerful enclave committee” at GATT—whose support was 
necessary for success within GATT.
46  The IPC was able to come to a consensus on what they 
wanted from GATT negotiations prior to the Uruguay Rounds and eventually gained the support 
of the business communities within Japan and Europe as well.
47  With Japan and Europe on 
board, the U.S. was able to overcome resistance from the “Group of Ten” developing countries 
that strongly opposed IP inclusion in GATT and by 1989, the remaining dissenting voice, India, 
accepted IP as an international trade concern.
48  
The private sector’s ability to so successfully influence trade negotiations and reform IP 
was nothing short of impressive.  “In effect, twelve corporations made public law for the 
world.”
49  While GATT negotiations on IP were by no means uncomplicated or effortless, the 
ultimate success of the IPC has been attributed to three main factors.  First, the U.S. applied 
continuous pressure on developing countries through threats of trade sanctions, leaving these 
countries with little room to hold onto their IP objections.
50  Second, IP presented a uniquely 
technical issue requiring the kind of significant expertise held by members of the IPC.  This 
overhanging “intellectual power” gave developed countries a leg up over developing countries at 
                                                        
45 The original founding members of the IPC included Pfizer, Merck, Bristol-Myers, Johnson and Johnson, IBM, 
Hewlett-Packard, Warner Communications, Du Pont, Monsanto, General Electric, General Motors, and Rockwell 
International.  GROSSE, supra note 22, at 353.   
46 SELL, supra note 23, at 109. 
47 Id. at 106.  For a more detailed account of consensus building leading up to the Uruguay Rounds and during 
GATT negotiations, see id. at 96–120. 
48 RYAN, supra note 29, at 111.  The “Group of Ten” was led by Brazil and India, and included Argentina, Cuba, 
Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia.  SELL, supra note 23, at 108 n. 12. 
49 SELL, supra note 23, at 96. 
50 For examples of the kinds of pressures faced by developing countries, see id. at 109–110.   12 
the negotiating table because of the latter’s lack of expert knowledge in this field.
51  Finally, 
TRIPS cannot be viewed in isolation.  GATT negotiations encompassed a very broad range of 
trade subjects that required a lot of give and take in various ways—a loss on TRIPS may have 
meant a win on another trade-related agreement that would ultimately payoff for a particular 
country in the overall package that emerged at the end of the Uruguay Round.
52   
b.  TRIPS and Compulsory Licenses 
TRIPS accomplished a number of objectives: 1) it required many countries to expand the 
subject matter of inventions that would qualify for IP rights, 2) it increased patent durations to 
twenty years and enacted new rights, 3) it required countries to increase their enforcement 
mechanisms, and 4) it established the TRIPS Council to oversee TRIPS operation and 
implementation.
53  Because developing countries were left with the burden of having to make 
more drastic changes to their IP laws as compared to developed countries, TRIPS allowed for 
some transition periods and did not require immediate compliance.
54  With respect to 
pharmaceutical subject matter, those developing countries that did not yet allow for 
pharmaceutical patents were given until 2005 to transition, but were required to establish 
                                                        
51 Drahos, supra note 17, at 15.   
52 Id.   
53 Drahos, supra note 17, at 6–7.  
TRIPS adopts a patent law minimum well above the previous standards of the 1883 Paris Convention, 
extending both subject matter covered and term of protection.  Patent rights are extended to virtually all 
subject matter (with exception to plants and animals other than micro-organisms), including pharmaceutical 
products, chemicals, pesticides, and plant varieties, and are to be granted for twenty years from the date the 
application is filed . . . States are required to provide adequate and effective enforcement mechanisms both 
internally and at the border . . . Infractions in IP can lead to sanctions on goods.  SELL, supra note 23, at 8. 
54 “Three transition periods are provided for in the Agreement: 1) the 1995–2000 period, at the end of which 
developing countries were obliged to implement the TRIPS Agreement; 2) the 2000–2005 period, which provided 
an additional period of 5 years to put in place product patent protection pharmaceuticals or agro-chemicals for those 
countries without such protection at the entry into force of the Agreement; and 3) the 1995–2006 period, after which 
least-developed countries would be required to implement their TRIPS obligations.”  SISULE F. MUSUNGU & 
CECILIA OH, COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, THE USE OF 
FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES? 5 (2005), 
available at http://www.who.int/entity/intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf.  The TRIPS Council extended 
the third transition period until 2016 when it implemented paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration in 2002.  Id.  For 
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mailboxes “to register pharmaceutical product patent applications during the transition period, 
thereby establishing priority for future review.”
55  However, some have argued that these 
transition periods inadequately acknowledged the actual level of change that was being required 
of developing countries where “mechanisms aiming at controlling restrictive business practices 
or the misuse of intellectual property rights are weak or non existent.”
56  Article 31 is the main 
compulsory licensing provision in TRIPS, but there are several other relevant Articles—notably, 
TRIPS never uses the phrase “compulsory license” in any of these Articles.  The following 
subsection will provide an overview of these TRIPS Articles, highlighting some of the provisions 
that touch on tensions between developing and developed countries, which later debated in the 
Qatar negotiations.
57  
To begin, Article 31—Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder—contains 
the bulk of the framework for countries to implement compulsory licensing regimes.  This 
Article pertains to all instances where a patent is used without the patent holder’s authorization, 
including uses by the government and government authorized parties.  Generally, Article 31 only 
permits unauthorized use if the user has made efforts to obtain a voluntary license “on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a 
reasonable period of time.”
58  This requirement can be waived, however, in three circumstances: 
1) cases of national emergency, 2) other circumstances of extreme urgency, or 3) cases of public 
non-commercial use.
59  Importantly, no member country is required to implement these 
exceptions to the voluntary license requirement.  When the exceptions are implemented, though, 
                                                        
55 La Croix & Liu, supra note 4, at 439. 
56 Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the use of Compulsory License: Options for Developing 
Countries 1 (South Centre, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity Working Paper No. 5, Oct. 1999). 
57 See supra Section II(a). 
58 TRIPS Art. 31(b). 
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the patent holder must be informed after the fact—“as soon as reasonably practicable” in cases of 
national emergency or extreme urgency, and “promptly” in cases of public-noncommercial use.
60 
All instances of use without authorization of the patent holder are subject to “adequate 
remuneration . . . taking into account the economic value of the authorization.”
61  Other 
requirements include that the scope and duration of the use must be limited to the authorized 
purpose
62, and that the use must be non-exclusive
63, non-assignable
64, and “predominantly for 
the supply of the domestic market.”
65  Although the private industry was averse to compulsory 
licensing generally, these particular TRIPS provisions were seen as victories by the IPC 
“because, in the past, a number of developing countries reserved the right to issue exclusive 
compulsory licenses.”
66   
Other relevant TRIPS Articles describe the basic structure of TRIPS and affect how 
member countries may implement compulsory licensing in their own IP infrastructures.  As a 
basic matter, Article 1 states that member countries are not required to provide more extensive IP 
protections than as are described in TRIPS.
67  Some of the other TRIPS Articles work to flag the 
potential problems that may arise as different countries behave inconsistently with respect to the 
precarious balance between promoting public health through access to necessary patented 
technologies, and protecting IP rights.  For example, Article 7 provides an explanation of the 
TRIPS objective to promote technological innovation and to transfer and disseminate technology 
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64 TRIPS Art. 31(e) 
65 TRIPS Art. 31(f).  This clause was amended in August 2003 such that it can be waived if several conditions are 
met.  See Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, 
Decision of WTO General Council, August 30, 2003, WT/L/540, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/TRIPS_e/implem_para6_e.htm [hereinafter August 2003 Decision]. 
66 SELL, supra note 23, at 117. 
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“to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to the social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights an obligations” through 
IP protections and enforcement.
68  Article 8 furthers this tension, which says that member 
countries may, consistent with other TRIPS provisions, “adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development.”
69  For an explicit TRIPS clause relevant 
to compulsory licensing, advocates of strong IP protections sometimes appeal to Article 27.1, the 
so-called anti-discrimination clause, which declares that patent right should be available and 
enjoyable “without discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.”
70  The argument here is that 
targeting pharmaceutical patents for compulsory licenses violates this provision of TRIPS.  
Finally, Article 30 contains the general exceptions clause to patent rights, allowing member 
countries to provide limited exceptions in certain circumstances
71, and Article 44 contains the 
provision on injunctions, allowing member countries to deny injunctive relief, and limit remedies 
to payment of remuneration, for unauthorized patent uses by government and government 
authorized entities
72. 
II. Post-TRIPS 
a.  HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries and Doha Declaration 
Prior to 1995 and TRIPS implementation, developing countries participated in the 
importation of generic and recently marketed drugs from countries where these drugs were not 
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70 TRIPS Art. 27.1.  This argument was made by the pharmaceutical companies involved in the South African 
Medicines Act litigation, see supra Section II(a), who argued that issuing compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs 
was discriminatory with respect to patents in the pharmaceutical field.  See JAMES LOVE, CONSUMER PROJECT ON 
TECHNOLOGY, COMPULSORY LICENSING: MODELS FOR STATE PRACTICE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ACCESS TO 
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patent protected.
73  This trade enabled developing countries to purchase medicines at affordable 
prices, and many viewed TRIPS as favoring the interests of the pharmaceutical industry at the 
expense of hindering these countries’ abilities to access essential medicines.
74   Many developing 
countries hoped that their TRIPS negotiation concessions would reduce pressures imposed on 
them by the U.S. through Section 301 sanctions,
75 but even after TRIPS adoption, the U.S. 
continued to closely monitor international IP rights.
76  On top of 301 sanctions, the U.S. now had 
the ability to enforce these rights in the WTO forum—the U.S. “has filed more WTO TRIPS 
complaints than all other member countries combined.”
77  As with TRIPS negotiations, the 
pharmaceutical industry through PhRMA continued to play a role in pushing the USTR to bring 
these complaints.
78   
In 1997, South African President Nelson Mandela signed into law the South Africa 
Medicines and Related Substance Act (Medicines Act), which, among other things, allowed the 
minister of health to provide for the parallel importation of patented drugs “so as to protect the 
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75 See supra p. 9. 
76 SELL, supra note 23, at 123–124 tbl.6.1 (US Trade Representative monitoring and enforcement of IP rights, 1996–
2000). 
77 Id. at 129.  The US began its pursuit of TRIPS enforcement in 1996, bringing six cases against Japan (“for failure 
to protect sound recordings”), India and Pakistan (both for failure “to establish a so-called ‘mailbox’ system for 
administering patent applications for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals”), Portugal (for failure to comply 
with the TRIPS mandated twenty-year patent term), and Turkey (for a “discriminatory box office tax”), Indonesia 
(for “discriminatory trademark practices”).  Id. at 129–132.  
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health of the public.”
79  At the time, one in five South Africans was HIV positive
80 and only the 
wealthy were able to afford the $10,000 to $15,000 per year costs of antiretroviral therapies 
(ARTs).
81  Following the passage of the Medicines Act, thirty-nine members of South Africa’s 
local version of PhRMA filed suit challenging the Act’s legality.
82  The U.S. government, under 
pressure from PhRMA, reacted to South Africa’s move in the same way that it had reacted 
throughout TRIPS negotiations: “[i]nertia led trade regulators to treat generic AIDS medicine on 
the model they use for pirated music discs and computer games—as a threat to the profits of 
copyright-holders, to be suppressed.”
83  On the whole, the U.S. treated pharmaceutical access as 
an IP and trade issue, not as a public health issue,
84 and placed South Africa on its Section 301 
“Watch List” to pressure the South African government to repeal its law.
85   
The U.S. similarly targeted Brazil, which began manufacturing generic HIV/AIDS drugs 
in 1998, by bringing a WTO action for TRIPS violations.  Unlike the case in South Africa, Brazil 
had already implemented a compulsory licensing regime by having generic manufacturers copy 
patented ART drugs.  Brazil was able to produce these drugs for $3,000 per year and provide 
them to HIV/AIDS patients for free.
86  As of 2001, Brazil’s death rate was cut by fifty percent 
and the country saved hundreds of millions of dollars in reduced hospitalizations caused by 
HIV/AIDS related infections.
87  This bold move demonstrated to the world that HIV/AIDS could 
be tackled successful—pharmaceutical patent holders’ efforts to negotiate with developing 
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81 Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 28, 2001.  
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countries on a country-by-country basis were inefficient and perhaps ineffectual.
88  Nevertheless, 
Brazil’s experience also demonstrated the strong political will and money necessary to 
successfully tackle a public health emergency by taking on the pharmaceutical industry: Brazil, 
“while it is a poor country, it is a rich poor country.”
89   
Under pressure from advocacy organizations as well as from public perception concerns, 
the Joint United Nations Program on AIDS (UNAIDS), along with five major pharmaceutical 
companies, agreed in 2000 to voluntarily reduce HIV/AIDS drug prices for certain African 
countries.
90  While this tactic may have created a temporary fix to access issues, it did not 
resolve the underlying issue of the pharmaceutical industry’s stronghold over preserving IP 
protections—with continued U.S. backing, the industry would be able to maintain their rights by 
preempting compulsory licensing schemes.  Pharmaceutical companies’ profits from Africa, 
which only accounted for 1.3 percent of all sales in 2002, were not their underlying concern with 
compulsory licensing.
91  Instead, they most feared compulsory licensing in developing countries 
because of the impact it would have in developed countries: “They worry that publicity about 
generic prices will fuel the American demand for cheap imports or price controls.”
92  However, 
the sentiment within the U.S. was changing.  A passionate voice grew out of James Love, 
director of Ralph Nader’s Consumer Project on Technology (CPT),
93 as well as activist 
organizations like Doctors Without Borders and ACT UP, concerning the increasing costs of 
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pharmaceuticals.
94  Also, much to PhRMA’s dismay,
95 President Clinton issued an executive 
order in May of 2000 stating that, in administering the Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. would not 
seek “the revocation or revision of any intellectual property law or policy of a beneficiary sub-
Saharan African country . . . that regulates HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies” 
if the country’s law promoted access to medicines and was compliant with TRIPS.
96  The Bush 
Administration declared that it would follow Clinton’s approach when Bush took office the 
following year, committing $200 million to a global AIDS fund, however simultaneously 
emphasizing the need to maintain stringent IP protections to promote innovation.
97 
In early 2001, Cipla, an Indian generic manufacturer, announced that it would sell the 
three-drug ART cocktail for $350 per patient per year to Doctors Without Borders, a group that 
had been advocating for this cause for quite some time.
98  The overall idea was to acquire the 
patents to these drugs via compulsory licensing within each developing country in need, and sell 
them as cheaply as possible.
99  In the midst of the pressures imposed on non-generic 
pharmaceutical companies by Cipla’s announcement, PhRMA and its thirty-nine member 
companies eventually dropped their lawsuit against South Africa weeks before the trial was set to 
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start in March of 2001.  The suit had become a “high profile event marked by protesters, grim 
images of dying mothers and babies, street demonstrations, and extensive media coverage.”
100  
The U.S. also felt increasing pressure to tone down its IP enforcement efforts in the WTO forum 
after the criticism it received concerning the litigation in South Africa, especially given Brazil’s 
successful generic manufacturing scheme.
101  As a result, the U.S. withdrew its case against 
Brazil during the UN General Assembly Special Session dedicated to issues of public health, 
opening the door for potential exceptional treatment of pharmaceutical products with respect to 
public health situations as was desired by the African WTO contingent.
102   
This notion ultimately resulted in the Doha Declaration, from the WTO’s Doha, Qatar 
Ministerial meeting in November 2001, which broadly stated that TRIPS was not to prevent 
member countries from “taking measures to protect public health,” and that it should be 
interpreted “to promote access to medicines for all.”
103  Moreover, the Doha Declaration 
explicitly stated that member countries have “the right to grant compulsory licenses and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted,”
104 as well as the right 
to “determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency.”
105  In 2002, Zimbabwe was the first country to implement government use provisions 
for ARTs, in the form of compulsory licensing, post-Doha.
106  In August 2003, paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration, which tabled discussions on compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical 
patents in countries with little or no manufacturing capacity, was clarified and the TRIPS 
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Council waived TRIPS Article 31(f) (requiring drugs produced pursuant to compulsory licenses 
be made “predominantly for the domestic market.”)
107     
As will be discussed in Section III(a)(ii), during the discussions leading up to the 
Declaration, the U.S. was positioned precariously because of the 2001 anthrax attacks that 
occurred weeks before the Doha discussions were set to take place—it was faced with handling 
domestic access issues to the antibiotic Cipro, without undermining its strong position against 
compulsory licensing.  Nevertheless, the U.S. and Switzerland “led the resistance,” arguing that 
TRIPS did not need clarification in the form of a declaration.
108  The U.S. was reluctant to 
concede to a broad statement concerning protecting public health generally, hoping to restrict 
discussions to the HIV/AIDS issue.
109  Although the Doha Declaration was not enacted into 
TRIPS, and thus lacks binding force, the movement from TRIPS, to the Doha Declaration, and 
finally to the WTO Decision on Paragraph 6, which collectively embody the WTO’s legal 
framework on compulsory licensing and access to medicines, demonstrates a shift in the 
international IP discussion framework away from trade and towards public health.
110  The shift 
has been slow and the effectiveness of Doha has been questioned, but the once all-power voice 
of the pharmaceutical industry, supported by the US, has arguably been somewhat overshadowed 
by global public health concerns. 
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b.  Post-TRIPS: Current U.S. Trade Policy 
In November 2007, the USTR issued a Fact Sheet summarizing its “Mission to Protect 
Intellectual Property Rights.”
111  Beginning with the USTR’s primary goal to “promote 
intellectual property and innovation around the world,” the Fact Sheet lists eight key parts of the 
USTR’s IP mission including, among other things, the previously discussed Section 301 
sanctions,
112 ongoing Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations, and 
pharmaceutical innovation promotion.
113  The US, as in the Doha negotiations, indicates that it 
still leans in favor of IP protections over public health promotion: “USTR seeks to eliminate 
market access barriers faced by U.S. pharmaceutical companies in many countries, and to 
promote affordable health care today, while supporting the innovation that assures improved 
health care tomorrow.”
114  This attitude was further exemplified by the U.S.’ decision in 2007 to 
move Thailand from the Watch List to the Priority Watch List under Section 301 in part because 
of Thailand’s decision to issue compulsory licenses for medicines including ARTs.
115 
The most recent developments in U.S international IP policy are contained in the ACTA 
negotiations.  The ACTA was initiated in 2006 by the U.S. and Japan to combat counterfeiting 
and piracy and to ultimately “negotiate an agreement that enhances international co-operation 
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and contains effective international standards for enforcing intellectual property rights.”
116  With 
negotiations set to conclude in 2010, the main goal of the ACTA is to pick up where TRIPS left 
off by strengthening enforcement issues and establishing more complete legal frameworks in 
certain areas.
117  As for compulsory licensing, negotiations have incorporated discussions on 
injunctions and damages as a means by which to stop infringement—the U.S. proposed language 
on this subject requires ACTA members to give judicial authorities the power to issue 
injunctions for infringement, with no exceptions.
118  If adopted, this provision would run 
contrary to one of the current mechanisms used in the U.S. to grant compulsory licenses, 28 
USC. § 1498, which provides that infringing use by or for the government can only be remedied 
by reasonable compensation.
119  It may also work to negate the holding of eBay v. 
MercExchange, which increased the burden on patent infringement plaintiffs who desire 
injunctive relief.
120  This move is perhaps further indicative of the U.S.’ unwillingness to take 
any steps that would effectively weaken IP rights, despite the increased worldwide cognizance of 
public health crises, including domestic crises as well.
121   
III. Compulsory Licensing and the US 
Calls for compulsory licensing of specific pharmaceutical patents during large-scale 
situations of significant public health concern have been relatively infrequent—notable examples 
include the 2001 anthrax attacks, and the avian flu pandemic scare in 2005.  Interestingly, despite 
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117 Id. at 2. 
118 Knowledge Ecology International (KEI), Comments on ACTA Provisions on Injunctions and Damages 7 (2010), 
available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/kei_rn_2010_1.pdf. 
119 28 USC. § 1498.  For a more extensive discussion on § 1498, see Section III(a). 
120 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  For further discussion on eBay, see Section III(b). 
121 It must be acknowledged, however, that ACTA negotiations encompass the seven realms of IP covered by 
TRIPS—copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-design 
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the U.S.’ strong objection to compulsory licensing abroad,
122 the U.S. itself issues compulsory 
licenses for various reason employing a several different legal methods.
123  For example, U.S. 
laws contain provisions for compulsory licensing programs for nuclear materials and atomic 
energy,
124 and air pollution.
125  The following sections will outline some of the ways that issues 
of compulsory licensing have arisen regarding pharmaceutical products, focusing on 28 USC. § 
1498, the Bayh-Dole Act, and court issued injunctions.
126  Of these three legal mechanisms, none 
have been successfully invoked to issue a compulsory license over a drug patent during a public 
health emergency. 
a.  28 U.S.C § 1498  
i.  Generally 
The U.S. government often appeals to 28 USC. § 1498 on Patent and Copyright Cases to 
justify the use of patented inventions without the permission of the patentee.  The statute, which 
was initially conceived for use during wartime urgencies,
127 states that when a patented invention 
is used by or for the U.S. government without a license, the patentee’s remedy shall be “for the 
recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.”
128  In other 
words, the statute, while entitling the patentee to compensation in the event that the government 
or a government authorized actor uses the patent without permission, does not allow the patentee 
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licensing in this context will not be discussed because of its relative inapplicability to public health emergencies. 
127 Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 853, 863 (citing Richmond 
Screw v. United States, 375 U.S. 331, 345 (1928) (“The intention and purpose of Congress . . . was to stimulate 
contractors to furnish what was needed for the war, without fear of becoming liable themselves for infringements to 
inventors or the owners or assignees of patents.”)). 
128 28 USC. § 1498(a).  The full text of the statute states: “Whenever an invention described in and covered by a 
patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner thereof 
or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in 
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to enjoin such an act.  Thus, the statute effectively serves as a waiver of the government’s 
sovereign immunity, while also functioning as a grant of compulsory licensing power.  Because 
the need for compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents would presumably require 
government intervention in times of public health emergencies, understanding the limits and 
reach of § 1498 is of particular import.
129   
An early invocation of § 1498 occurred in the 1970s resulting from concerns over 
increasing drug prices.  The idea stemmed from a staff economist of the Senate Small Business 
Committee's monopoly subcommittee, Benjamin Gordon, who proposed that the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) reverse engineer patented drugs in order to determine if brand name 
manufacturers were excessively pricing them.
130  If so, he proposed that generic manufacturers 
should be contracted to produce and distribute the drugs at lower costs.
131  From this idea, the 
government targeted the tranquilizer meprobamate, which was purchased by the Veterans 
Administration in Denmark for $1.55 per 500 tablets, while sold in the U.S. for $26 by Carter-
Wallace.
132  Carter-Wallace attempted to sue the U.S. government for infringement, but the 
patent was held invalid and the § 1498 issue ultimately not litigated.
133 
Since Carter-Wallace, the specific mechanics of § 1498 have been hashed out over the 
years.  Generally, the Federal Circuit has stated “the coverage of § 1498 should be broad so as 
not to limit the Government’s freedom in procurement by considerations of private patent 
infringement.”
134  Still, determining what actions are encompassed by the phrase “by or for the 
United States” must be considered carefully in order to ensure that private parties acting under 
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133 See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. U.S., 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971); see also Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. U.S., 496 F.2d 
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government direction can claim protection under § 1498.
135  For example, in TVI Energy Corp. v. 
Blane, the Federal Circuit held that the defendant’s infringing use of the plaintiff’s patent to bid 
on a government contract was within the scope of § 1498 where the defendant had not yet 
received the contract—the defendant’s only purpose for engaging in infringing activity “was to 
comply with the Government’s bidding requirements.” The court held that the government did 
not have to explicitly require that the third party infringe in order for the infringing activity to 
qualify as a use or manufacture by or for the government.
136  Despite some clarification by cases 
such as TVI as to what kinds of third party infringement activities fall within § 1498, there 
nevertheless remains some ambiguity.
137 
 More recently in the 2006 case, Zoltek Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit held 
that plaintiff Zoltek could not bring an action under § 1498 where the government contractor, 
Lockheed Martin, allegedly infringed a process patent for manufacturing silicide fiber products 
for use in F-22 Fighters.
138  The Federal Circuit reasoned that because part of Lockheed’s 
manufacturing process occurred outside of the US, § 1498(a) did not apply.
139  This conclusion 
resulted from a previous Federal Circuit decision holding that “direct infringement under section 
271(a)
140 is a necessary predicate for government liability under section 1498”
141 where “a 
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process cannot be used ‘within’ the United States as required by section 271(a) unless each of the 
steps is performed within this country.”
142  Furthermore, the court denied Zoltek’s claim that the 
government’s infringement was a “taking of private property for public use under the Fifth 
Amendment.”
143  According to the court, in enacting § 1498, “Congress provided a specific 
sovereign immunity waiver for a patentee to recover for infringement by the government.  Had 
Congress intended to clarify the dimensions of the patent rights as property interests under the 
Fifth Amendment, there would have been no need for the new and limited sovereign immunity 
waiver.”
144   
The Federal Circuit’s holding on the Takings Clause has stirred some controversy
145 
because of an earlier case in 1999 where the court stated that patents “are surely included within 
the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State without due process of law.”
146  
Judge Plager in his Zoltek dissent observed that “absolving the Government from liability, now 
and forever, for the wrongful conduct of its agents just because any one step of a multi-step 
patented method can be found to have occurred outside the United States [is] an invitation to 
strategic conduct if ever there was one.”
147  Nevertheless, although this case did not involve a 
pharmaceutical patent, it represents the current reach of § 1498 as it exists today and indicates 
that the Federal Circuit may be leaning towards a more generous implementation of compulsory 
licensing schemes for government use—this inclination may perhaps be furthered in the event of 
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immediate necessity as in the case of a public health emergency.  Nonetheless, if the U.S. is 
successful in its ACTA negotiations, Congress may be forced to amend this long-existing law to 
allow for injunctive relief for any infringing use of a patent, including that of the government. 
ii.  Anthrax 
The 2001 anthrax scare, code-named “Amerithrax” by the FBI,
148 was the first instance 
where § 1498 was implicated because of the potential need for mass access to a patented drug 
caused by a public health emergency—bioterrorism.  Anthrax is a disease caused by the spore-
forming bacteria Bacillus anthracis and is categorized by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) as a Category A agent (those that “pose the greatest possible threat for a bad 
effect on public health”).
149  Symptoms from anthrax vary depending on the way in which the 
individual is exposed (types of anthrax include cutaneous, inhalation, and gastrointestinal), and 
can appear within seven days of initial exposure.
150  Antibiotic treatment can be successful 
depending on how soon after exposure treatment begins and the type of anthrax involved.
151  In 
the fall of 2001, a number of individuals were exposed to anthrax through letters delivered via 
the U.S. Postal Service resulting in five deaths and seventeen other cases of infection.
152  
Although anthrax did not ultimately pan out to become a full-fledged public health emergency, 
this example aptly demonstrates the discrepancy between U.S. sentiment about strong IP rights 
abroad, and its attempts to lift those protections during domestic public health situations.  
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During the 2001 attacks, access to the antibiotic ciproflaxin (Cipro),
153 approved by the 
FDA for anthrax treatment, became a major point of contention because of the conflicts between 
public health necessity and the rights of Cipro’s patent holder, Bayer.
154  Senator Charles 
Schumer (D-NY) called for generic manufacturing of Cipro in October 2001, despite Bayer’s 
willingness to ramp up production, to deal with the potential need for increased quantities at 
lower costs in the event of a full-scale anthrax attack.
155  Cipro’s profits in 1999 were $1.04 
billion, where Bayer charged $4.67 per pill wholesale and retail prices reached up to $7 per 
pill.
156  At that time, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was hesitant—"If we 
have an emergency, the manufacturers can turn this around quickly.  We have to be careful about 
patent protections—there's a balance there"
157—but was still “nudging . . . Bayer to relax the 
patent on Cipro.”
158  In fact, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson seemed largely unaware of § 
1498, believing that allowing generic manufacturers to produce Cipro before its patent expired 
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was illegal.
159  Overall, the initial sentiment expressed by the Bush Administration was one of 
extreme reluctance to intrude upon patent protections despite strong concerns surrounding access 
to potentially necessary medicines.
160   
Still, § 1498 was not overlooked.  The New York Times reported that “American law is 
very clear: when the United States government needs a patented product, any official authorized 
to make purchases can ignore the patent and license someone else to make it.”
161  Unfortunately, 
the decision to appeal to § 1498 and authorize a compulsory license for Cipro was much more 
complicated politically—Cipro was used in Africa to cure secondary brain infections associated 
with AIDS patients.
162  To lift U.S. patent protections on Cipro for the potential anthrax 
pandemic, while simultaneously fighting against the very same thing for AIDS in Africa would 
place the U.S. in a difficult position.
163  On top of this, Qatar negotiations that would ultimately 
result in the Doha Declaration were looming a month away.
164  Aid organizations hoped that the 
U.S. government, after being presented with its own public health emergency of sorts, would 
become more sympathetic to the health needs of developing countries.
165  “If the United States 
presumably was willing to engage in compulsory licensing to address a national emergency (in 
the wake of several deaths, but uncertain about the magnitude of the threat) how could it possibly 
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deny that same prerogative to developing countries daily facing thousands of preventable 
deaths?”
166 
In the end, the § 1498 legal inquiry was rendered moot because the U.S. government was 
able to strike a deal with Bayer to purchase Cipro at reduced costs  ($1 per pill—equivalent to 
the prices that would have been charged by generic manufacturers) after Thompson publically 
demanded that Bayer cut prices under threat of appealing to generic alternatives pursuant to § 
1498.
167  Regardless, the threat of an anthrax pandemic was never realized and the need for large 
quantities of Cipro never became reality.
168  The Bush Administration’s shift from unwillingness 
to consider generic alternatives at all to effectively forcing Bayer’s hand through threat of 
compulsory licensing could just be attributed to a blunder caused by inadequate legal 
information surrounding § 1498.  Even though the Administration managed to save American 
taxpayers significant costs as a result of the deal, it nevertheless side-stepped the need to actually 
exercise its § 1498 power, and still tilted in favor of patent protection—“the agreement [was] 
based on the condition that the company would continue to remain the sole supplier of the drug 
in the U.S. till December 2003.”169  
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iii.  U.S. Influenza Pandemics 
Despite the discussions of the previous sections, the 2005 avian flu pandemic scare is 
indicative of the possibility that the U.S. may not be faced with the need to invoke § 1498 
because of cooperation, albeit reluctant, from the pharmaceutical industry.  Avian influenza, 
H5N1, while primarily contained within the avian species, caused much concern in the U.S. 
because of a number of human cases that occurred that year in southeast Asia—overall, “98 
human H5N1 cases with 43 deaths were reported from five countries,” including Cambodia, 
China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
170  There was a fear that the virus would mutate into a 
form that was more easily transmitted among humans, causing a pandemic situation.
171  
Escalating the tension in the U.S. at the time was the production shortage of Roche/Gilead’s 
Tamiflu,
172 “the most efficient antiviral treatment” against avian flu.
 173  Initially, Roche refused 
to give into the will of prominent national and international figures who pressed for compulsory 
licensing of Tamiflu, or at the very least, voluntary licensing by Roche to generic 
manufacturers.
174   
As in the case of Cipro, Senator Charles Schumer took a strong position demanding that 
Roche issue licenses for the generic manufacturing of Tamiflu under threat of legislative action 
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under § 1498.
175  Schumer’s legislative proposal announcement cited that “[i]nfectious disease 
experts advise that each country have enough Tamiflu on hand for 40%– 50% of its population.  
That would require the U.S. to stockpile enough of the drug for over 100 million people.”
176  
Roche, in response, stated its intent to deliver an “eightfold expansion of its Tamiflu production 
capacity by the middle of 2006,” refusing to sublicense Tamiflu for reasons such as the “complex 
and time-consuming” nature of the drug.
177   The company was supported by typical arguments 
against compulsory licensing, including disincentives to innovation, made by the PhRMA.
178 
Although the Bush Administration impliedly backed Roche’s position,
179 reputational costs as 
well as compulsory license threats likely contributed to Roche’s eventual decision to agree and 
sublicense its Tamiflu production rights to generic manufacturers.
180  By April 2007, Roche had 
signed nineteen sublicensing agreements for Tamiflu production in nine different countries.
181  In 
addition, Roche took steps to increase access to Tamiflu by developing countries through 
donations and reduced prices.
182   
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b.  Bayh-Dole Act 
Several developments in patent law occurred in the 1980s to increase patent 
protections,
183 including the University and Small Business Patent Act (Bayh-Dole Act), which 
transfers exclusive control for inventions developed through federally funded research from the 
government to the university or other organization in which the invention was created.
184  One 
provision of Bayh-Dole allows the federal agency, from which the research grant was obtained, 
to “march-in” and require that the contractor or exclusive licensee issue a license if one of four 
conditions is met.
185  Relevant here are the first two conditions that either “effective steps to 
achieve practical application of the subject invention” have not been taken within reasonable 
time,
186 or there is a need “to alleviate health or safety needs.”
187 These provisions effectively 
work as a commercialization requirement, allowing the government to issue compulsory licenses 
of patents obtained on research conducted via federal funding if the patent holder is doing an 
inadequate job of getting the invention to market.  In so doing, the march-in provisions arguably 
impinge on IP rights more so than 28 U.S.C. § 1498 because they do not require that the patent 
holder be reasonably compensated for the compulsory license. 
Four government agencies—the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, 
NASA, and NIH—“rely on Commerce regulations for the Bayh-Dole Act and on their agencies’ 
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interpretations of the act to determine whether to exercise their march-in authority.”
188  These 
agencies reportedly rely on public and private sources of information to determine if exercising 
their march-in authority is worth investigation, but do not actively employ mechanisms to 
determine march-in candidates.
189  While three petitions have been made to the NIH asking the 
government to exercise its march-in rights, the NIH has never elected to do so.
190  In all three 
instances, the NIH determined that the inventions were already being marketed and that 
marching in would not alleviate health and safety concerns.
191  Some authors have suggested that 
despite this fact, there may be no need to strengthen the march-in rule because universities’ 
technology transfer offices often structure their licensing agreements with 
producers/manufacturers in terms of the Bayh-Dole provisions.
192  In other words, universities 
will agree to license their products only if manufacturers agree to actually use and produce the 
technology. 
Overall, it seems unlikely that the Bayh-Dole march-in provisions will gain momentum 
as a compulsory licensing mechanism by the U.S. government.  Agencies are reluctant to assert 
their march-in rights for reasons such as an inclination to leave drug-pricing issues for Congress 
(when petitioners argue that march-in rights should be exercised because of prohibitive drug 
costs)
193 and lack of specialized expertise in certain fields.
 194  Furthermore, compulsory 
licensing through Bayh-Dole is of limited utility during public health emergencies because it 
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may not be as efficient in bringing necessary drugs to the public as § 1498 (march-in proceedings 
tend to be lengthy).
195  
c.  Injunctions Issued by the U.S. Supreme Court—eBay v. MercExchange 
After the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange,
196 where the Court 
extended the application of the general four-factor test for injunctive relief to cases of patent 
infringement,
197 the ability of patent owners to obtain permanent injunctions under 35 USC. § 
283 for infringing activities arguably diminished.
198  Because a denial of an injunction under 
eBay works as a compulsory license, the decision “creates a dynamic where every enforcement 
action for an intellectual property right can turn into a de facto compulsory licensing case.”
199  
For example in 2008, the Federal Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision to grant an 
injunction, and instead issued a compulsory license to the defendant in an infringement action 
involving a diagnostic tool for the treatment of hepatitis C.
200  The Court based its decision on 
the fact that the district court had already granted reasonable royalties for future sales, which in 
effect acted as a compulsory license, and could not be granted in addition to an injunction—this 
went to the first prong of the eBay test (irreparable harm).
201  Although the eBay decision 
allowed courts to explore in the realm of compulsory licensing for reasons that include public 
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interest concerns, the current U.S. position on injunctions in the ACTA negotiations may work to 
negate this judicial discretion.
202 
IV. Conclusion 
Clearly, the U.S. is not immune to public health emergencies.  While any potential 
emergencies are unlikely to reach the level of the AIDS crisis in South Africa, for instance, they 
may nevertheless involve the need for access to mass quantities of patented drugs in short 
periods of time.  It is important to note, though, that the U.S. is in a unique position in having the 
capacity to handle access to medicines during public health emergencies without the 
implementation of a compulsory licensing scheme.  Some potential factors that contribute to the 
U.S.’ position include its domestic manufacturing capacity, its public health infrastructure (in 
being able to quickly disseminate important health information), and most importantly, its 
exceptional relationship with the pharmaceutical industry.  Although recent developments in 28 
U.S.C. § 1498 and patent infringement jurisprudence may be indicative of a shift in the judiciary 
towards expanding government authority over patents,
203 the U.S. stance in ACTA negotiations 
indicate that the executive branch is not headed in that direction and essentially remains in the 
same position in which it stood during TRIPS negotiations—heavily influenced by the 
pharmaceutical industry and therefore heavily in favor of maintaining strong IP rights.  U.S. 
trade policy may not, however, accurately reflect public sentiment towards access to medicines 
given the heated debates surrounding the anthrax attack, where only 30,000 people were 
ultimately caused to take precautionary antibiotics,
204 and avian flu, where no Americans fell ill.   
Still, the existing means by which the U.S. can issue compulsory licenses have, in the 
past, simply not been utilized, but perhaps for good reason.  For instance, compulsory licensing 
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through § 1498 is not an ideal mechanism for providing consistent remuneration to the 
patentee—court determinations of the compensation appropriate for a compulsory license are 
unlikely to provide an adequate level of consistency that will satisfy patent holders.  
Pharmaceutical companies may prefer to handle negotiations on their own and as the market 
demands, depending on the nature of the public health emergency itself, as well as public 
reaction to it.  Moreover, some have argued that § 1498 is not in compliance with TRIPS because 
of its overall lack of requirements for a government justification prior to infringing a patent, 
further indicating the inadequacy of § 1498 as a compulsory licensing statute.
205  The other two 
compulsory licensing possibilities discussed in this paper, the Bayh-Dole march-in provisions 
and court imposed injunction denials, are similarly unlikely to play any kind of serious role in 
future public health emergencies.  With respect to the former, the NIH has clearly expressed a 
reluctance to interfere with drug patents, and with respect to the latter, private parties will 
probably refrain from partaking in infringing activities for the sake of public health during a 
high-profile emergency situation.  Finally, pending the outcome of ACTA negotiations, all of 
these legal methods to access patented products may have to be revisited.  
Regardless of the legal compulsory licensing schemes, the Cipro and Tamiflu examples 
show that the U.S. may find it worth its while to do the back-and-forth with industry through 
threats and public negotiations whenever a public health emergency implicates a pharmaceutical 
patent.  Because of this interplay between the U.S. and the pharmaceutical industry, the 
government is able to reap the initial benefits of appearing to its constituents as taking a strong 
stance against the profit-driven motives of drug companies, while drug companies are later able 
to take credit for cooperation and benevolence.  These domestic disputes may invite ridicule 
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from the international community, but nevertheless allow the U.S. to continue to cater to the 
pharmaceutical industry’s interests in maintaining strong IP rights abroad.  